Concession behaviour in automated negotiation by Lopes, Fernando & Coelho, Helder
Concession Behaviour in Automated Negotiation
Fernando Lopes1 and Helder Coelho2
1 LNEG − National Research Institute
Estrada do Pac¸o do Lumiar 22, 1649-038 Lisbon, Portugal
fernando.lopes@ineti.pt
2 University of Lisbon, Department of Computer Science
Bloco C6, Piso 3, Campo Grande, 1749-016 Lisbon, Portugal
hcoelho@di.fc.ul.pt
Abstract. Traditional negotiation, conducted face-to-face and via mail
or telephone, is often diﬃcult to manage, prone to misunderstanding,
and time consuming. Automated negotiation promises a higher level of
process eﬃciency, and more importantly, a faster emergence and a higher
quality of agreements. The potential monetary impact has led to an in-
creasing demand for systems composed of software agents representing
individuals or organizations and capable of reaching eﬃcient agreements.
At present, work on automated negotiation has generated many useful
ideas and concepts leading to important theories and systems. Yet, the
design of software agents with negotiation competence largely lacks sys-
tematic, traceable, and reproducible approaches, and thus remains more
an art than a science. Against this background, this paper presents a
model for software agents that handles two-party and multi-issue negoti-
ation. The model incorporates various concession strategies and negoti-
ation tactics. Concession strategies are computationally tractable func-
tions that deﬁne the tactics to be used both at the outset and throughout
negotiation. Tactics, in turn, are functions that specify the short-term
moves to be made at each point of negotiation.
Keywords: Automated negotiation, Negotiation strategies, Negotiation
tactics, Multi-agent systems.
1 Introduction
Negotiation is a discussion among conﬂicting parties with the aim of reaching
agreement about a divergence of interests [13]. The list of situations that can
be handled by negotiation is endless. Some situations are purely competitive, as
when the parties have completely opposed interests. Other situations are purely
cooperative, as when the parties have perfectly compatible interests. Most situa-
tions are mixed-motive, containing elements of both competitive and cooperative
situations − the parties’ interests are imperfectly correlated [14]. There are, how-
ever, several characteristics common to most negotiation situations, including [6]:
(i) two or more parties, (ii) a conﬂict among the parties, and (iii) an individual
preference to search for agreement rather than to appeal to a higher authority,
to permanently break oﬀ contact, or to ﬁght openly.
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Negotiation may involve two parties (bilateral negotiation) or more than two
parties (multilateral negotiation) and one issue (single-issue negotiation) or many
issues (multi-issue negotiation). Also, negotiation may proceed through several
distinct phases or stages, notably a beginning or initiation phase, a middle or
problem-solving phase, and an ending or resolution phase [6]. The initiation
phase focuses on preparation and planning for negotiation − it is marked by
each party’s eﬀorts to emphasize points of diﬀerence and to posture for positions.
The problem-solving phase seeks a solution for a dispute − it is characterized by
extensive interpersonal interaction, strategic maneuvers, and movement toward
a mutually acceptable agreement. The resolution phase focuses on details and
implementation of a ﬁnal agreement.
Traditional negotiation, conducted face-to-face and via mail or telephone, is
often diﬃcult to manage, prone to misunderstanding, and time consuming [1].
Negotiators are typically satisﬁed with the ﬁnal outcome and, in many instances,
proudly describe it. However, they frequently view conﬂict-laden situations with
a fundamentally more distrustful, win-lose attitude than is necessary or desirable,
and settle for outcomes that are worse for them than other available solutions
[19]. They often fail to achieve agreements on the Pareto optimal or eﬃcient
frontier (i.e., the locus of achievable joint evaluations from which no joint gains
are possible [17]).
Automated negotiation promises a higher level of process eﬃciency, and most
importantly, a faster emergence and a higher quality of agreements. The potential
monetary impact has led to an increasing demand for systems composed of
software agents representing individuals or organizations and capable of reaching
mutually beneﬁcial agreements (e.g., the industrial trend toward agent-based
supply chain management). Yet, the design of software agents with negotiation
competence largely lacks systematic, traceable, and reproducible approaches,
and thus remains more an art than a science. There is much further work to be
done, and some current ideas and concepts are likely to be substantially altered
as researchers move ahead (but see [10]).
Against this background, this paper presents a model for software agents that
handles two-party and multi-issue negotiation. The model incorporates a bilat-
eral negotiation protocol, a set of concession strategies, and a set of negotiation
tactics. The protocol formalizes the set of possible tasks that the agents can per-
form during the course of negotiation. The strategies and tactics formalize the
tasks that each agent should perform to negotiate eﬀectively. More speciﬁcally,
the strategies deﬁne the tactics to be used both at the beginning and during the
course of negotiation. The tactics formalize the individual moves to be made at
each point of the negotiation process.
This paper builds on our previous work in the area of automated negotiation.
In particular, it extends the work presented in [7,8,9] by introducing precise
deﬁnitions for the key components of our model. Also, it formalizes concession
strategies as computationally tractable functions that specify the tactics to be
used both at the outset and throughout negotiation. Furthermore, at every pe-
riod, strategies state whether bargaining should continue or terminate.
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a nego-
tiation model for software agents. Section 3 discusses related work and compares
the negotiation model with other existing models. Finally, section 4 presents con-
cluding remarks and indicates future avenues of research.
2 A Negotiation Model for Software Agents
Let A={a1, a2} be the set of autonomous agents (negotiating parties). Both the
number of agents and their identity are ﬁxed and known to all the participants.
The negotiation issues {x1, . . . , xn} are quantitative in nature and deﬁned over
continuous domains {D1, . . . , Dn}, respectively. For each issue xk, the range of
acceptable values is represented by the interval Dk =[mink,maxk]. The issues
are also known to all the participants.
Preparation and planning are often considered the foundations for success in
negotiation [6]. Accordingly, eﬀective negotiators often make eﬀorts to perform a
number of activities before starting to bargain, including: (i) prioritizing the is-
sues, and (ii) deﬁning realistic, pessimistic, and optimistic targets. Prioritization
usually involves two steps, namely deciding which issues are most important and
which are least important, and determining whether the issues are connected or
separate. Priorities can be set in a number of ways (e.g., to use standard tech-
niques, such as the nominal group technique). For the sake of simplicity, we
consider that negotiators set priorities by ranking-order the issues.
Target setting usually involves deﬁning three key points for each issue at stake:
1. the resistance point or limit − the point where negotiators decide to stop
the negotiation rather than to continue, because any settlement beyond this
point is not minimally acceptable;
2. the target point or level of aspiration − the point where negotiators realisti-
cally expect to achieve a settlement;
3. the optimistic point or asking price − the best deal negotiators could possibly
hope to assume.
We present below precise deﬁnitions for these intuitions.
Deﬁnition 1 (Issue, Agenda). A negotiation issue is a resource to be allocated
or a consideration to be resolved in negotiation. The negotiating agenda is the
set I={x1, . . . , xn} of issues to be deliberated during negotiation. ”
Deﬁnition 2 (Priority, Weight). The priority prt ik of an agent ai ∈A for
an issue xk ∈I is a number that represents the importance of xk. The weight
w ik is a number that represents the preference for xk. ”
Deﬁnition 3 (Limit, Target Point, Optimistic Point). The limit limik of
an agent ai ∈A for an issue xk ∈I is the ultimate fallback position for xk, the
point beyond which ai is unwilling to concede on xk. The target point trg ik is the
point at which ai is satisﬁed with the value of xk. The optimistic point opt ik is
the most preferred or ideal value for xk. ”
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2.1 The Negotiation Protocol and Negotiators’ Preferences
The negotiation protocol is an alternating oﬀers protocol [11]. Two agents or
players bargain over the division of the surplus of n≥2 distinct issues. The
players determine an allocation of the issues by alternately submitting proposals
at times in T = {1, 2, . . .}. This means that one proposal is made per time period
t∈T , with an agent, say ai ∈A, oﬀering in odd periods {1, 3, . . .}, and the other
agent aj ∈A oﬀering in even periods {2, 4, . . .}. The agents have the ability to
unilaterally opt out of the negotiation when responding to a proposal.
The negotiation process starts with ai submitting a proposal p1i→j to aj in
period t=1. The agent aj receives p1i→j and can either accept the oﬀer (Yes),
reject it and opt out of the negotiation (Opt), or reject it and continue bargaining
(No). In the ﬁrst two cases the negotiation ends. Speciﬁcally, if p1i→j is accepted,
negotiation ends successfully and the agreement is implemented. Conversely,
if p1i→j is rejected and aj decides to opt out, negotiation terminates with no
agreement. In the last case, negotiation proceeds to the next time period t=2,
in which aj makes a counter-proposal p2j→i. The tasks just described are then
repeated. Once an agreement is reached, the agreed-upon allocations of the issues
are implemented.
Deﬁnition 4 (Proposal). Let A be the set of negotiating agents and I the set
of issues at stake in negotiation. Let T be the set of time periods. A proposal
pti→j submitted by an agent ai ∈A to an agent aj ∈A in period t∈T is a vector
of issue values:
pti→j = (v1, . . . , vn)
where vk, k=1, . . . , n, is a value of an issue xk ∈ I. ”
Deﬁnition 5 (Agreement, Possible Agreements). An agreement is a pro-
posal accepted by all the negotiating agents in A. The set of possible agreements
is:
S = {(v1, . . . , vn) ∈  n : vk ∈ Dk, for k = 1, . . . , n}
where vk is a value of an issue xk ∈ I. ”
Negotiators should express their own preferences to rate and compare incoming
oﬀers and counter-oﬀers. The most common way to model the preferences of
the negotiating agents is probably to deﬁne a utility function over all possible
outcomes [4,17]. Let I={x1, . . . , xn} be the agenda and D={D1, . . . , Dn} the
set of issue domains. We consider that each agent ai ∈A has a continuous util-
ity function: Ui :{D1×. . .×Dn} ∪ {Opt, Disagreement} →  . Accordingly, when
the utility for ai from one outcome is greater than from another outcome, we
assume that ai prefers the ﬁrst outcome over the second. The outcome Opt is
interpreted as one of the agents opting out of the negotiation in a given period
of time. Perpetual disagreement is denoted by Disagreement.
Now, the additive model is probably the most widely used in multi-issue
negotiation − the parties assign numerical values to the diﬀerent levels on each
issue and add them to get an entire oﬀer evaluation [17]. This model is simple
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and intuitive, and therefore well suited to the purposes of this work. We consider
that each agent ai has a scoring or single-issue (marginal) utility function for
each issue at stake in negotiation, i.e., a function that gives the score ai assigns
to a value of an issue xk. For convenience, scores are kept in the interval [0,1].
Additionally, as mentioned above, we consider that ai has a multi-issue utility
function to rate oﬀers.
Deﬁnition 6 (Multi-Issue Utility Function). Let A={a1, a2} be the set
of negotiating agents and I={x1, . . . , xn} the negotiating agenda. The utility
function Ui of an agent ai ∈A to rate oﬀers and counter-oﬀers takes the form:
Ui(x1, . . . , xn) =
n∑
k=1
w ik ×V ik (xk)
where:
(i) w ik is the weight of ai for an issue xk ∈ I;
(ii) V ik (xk) is the (marginal) utility function of ai for xk. ”
Negotiation may end with either agreement or no agreement. Failure to agree
can occur in two ways: (i) either party decides to opt out unilaterally, or (ii)
the two do not agree to any proposal. The resistance points or limits play a
key role in reaching agreement when the parties have the ability to unilaterally
opt out of the negotiation − they deﬁne the worst agreement for a given party
which is still better than opting out. For each agent ai ∈A, we will denote this
agreement by sˆi ∈S. Hence, sˆi will be the least-acceptable agreement for ai, i.e.,
the worst (but still acceptable) agreement for ai. The set of all agreements that
are preferred by ai to opting out will be denoted by Si.
Deﬁnition 7 (Least-acceptable Agreement, Acceptable Agreements).
The least-acceptable agreement for an agent ai ∈A is deﬁned as: sˆi =(limi1, . . . ,
limin), where limik, k=1, . . . , n, is the limit of ai for an issue xk ∈ I. The set of
acceptable agreements for ai is:
Si = {s : s ∈ S, Ui(s) ≥ Ui(sˆi)}
where Ui(sˆi) is the utility of sˆi for ai. ”
Perpetual disagreement is the least-preferred or worst outcome, i.e., disagree-
ment is even worse than opting out. Thus, the agents prefer any agreement in
any given time period over the continuation of the negotiation process indeﬁ-
nitely. Formally, and more precisely, we state the following:
(1) (Acceptable agreements versus opting out). For every agent ai ∈A and ac-
ceptable agreement s∈Si, Ui(s) ≥ Ui(Opt).
(2) (Opting out versus Disagreement). For every agent ai ∈A,
Ui(Opt) > Ui(Disagreement).
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2.2 Concession Strategies
The opening oﬀer and the initial concessions are two central elements of nego-
tiation [19]. When negotiation begins, the parties are faced with a fundamental
question − should the opening oﬀer be exaggerated, more toward the optimistic
point, or modest, somewhat closer to the limit? The main advantages of an ex-
aggerated initial oﬀer are [12]: (i) negotiators can concede further and hence
elicit more counterconcessions from their opponent, and (ii) negotiators’ later
demands are likely to look generous. However, an exaggerated opening oﬀer
frequently communicates an attitude of toughness that may be harmful to long-
term relationships. Also, it may be seen as too high by the other party and
therefore summarily rejected. By contrast, an opening oﬀer seen as reasonable
or modest by the other party could perhaps have been higher, either to leave
more room for movement or to achieve a higher settlement.
After the ﬁrst round of oﬀers, other fundamental question is, what concessions
are to be made? Negotiators can choose to make none, holding ﬁrm and insist-
ing on their original positions. By taking a ﬁrm position, negotiators attempt
to capture most of the initial bargaining or settlement range (deﬁned by the
opening oﬀers of both parties). However, there is the very real possibility that
ﬁrmness will be reciprocated − one or both parties may become intransigent
and withdraw completely. Negotiators can also choose to make some conces-
sions, being ﬂexible and changing their original positions. Flexibility often keeps
negotiation going − the more ﬂexible one party seems to be, the more the other
party will believe that a settlement is possible. Hence, if concessions are to be
made, another fundamental question is, how large should they be?
Concession strategies are computationally tractable functions that model sig-
niﬁcant opening positions and typical patterns of concessions. They specify the
tactics to be used at the outset of negotiation (to prepare the initial oﬀers).
Also, at each step of negotiation, they specify the tactics to be used in prepar-
ing counter-oﬀers. Furthermore, concession strategies state whether bargaining
should continue or terminate. The words “computationally tractable functions”
presume that agents are able to compute concession strategies in a reasonable
amount of time. A formal deﬁnition of a generic strategy follows.
Deﬁnition 8 (Concession Strategy). Let A be the set of negotiating agents,
I the negotiating agenda, T the set of time periods, and S the set of possible
agreements. Let ai ∈A be the ﬁrst agent to submit a proposal and Ti his set
of tactics. A concession strategy Ci : Ti×Ti×T → S ∪ {Yes, No, Opt} for ai is a
function with the following general form:
Ci =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
apply Oi(xk) and oﬀer p1i→j , if ai’s turn and t=1
reject pt−1j→i and quit , if aj’s turn and Ui(p
t−1
j→i)<Ui(sˆi)
apply Yi(xk, f ik ) and prepare p
t
i→j if aj’s turn and Ui(p
t−1
j→i)≥Ui(sˆi)
if U∗i ≥0 accept pt−1j→i else reject ,
oﬀer compromise pti→j , if ai’s turn and t>1
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where:
(i) p1i→j is the opening oﬀer of ai, p
t−1
j→i is the oﬀer of aj for period t−1 of
negotiation, and pti→j is the oﬀer of ai for the next period t of negotiation;
(ii) for each issue xk ∈ I, Oi(xk) is an opening negotiation tactic, Yi(xk, f ik ) is
a concession tactic, and f ik ∈ [0, 1] is a real number that deﬁnes the magnitude
of a concession on xk, referred to as the concession factor of ai for xk (see
subsection 2.3, below);
(iii) Ui(sˆi) is the utility of the least-acceptable agreement for ai;
(iv) U∗i = Ui(p
t−1
j→i) − Ui(pti→j) ”
Two explanatory and cautionary notes are in order here. First, notation is being
abused somewhat, by using Ci rather than Ci(Oi(xk), Yi(xk, f ik ), t). The abuse
helps improve readability, however, and meaning will always be clear from con-
text. Second, tactics are functions of a single issue rather than a vector of issues.
This permits great ﬂexibility, since it allows agents to model a wide range of
concession behaviors (e.g., large initial demands and slow concession making).
Interestingly, bargainers sometimes have diﬀerent strengths of preference for
the issues at stake − they place greater emphasis on some key issues and make
signiﬁcant eﬀorts to resolve them favourably. Hence, they often yield on less
important or low-priority issues, in the hope that their opponent will make com-
pensating concessions [17,19]. A generic low-priority concession making strategy
for ai takes the form (again, the deﬁnition slightly abuses notation):
C iLP =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
apply Oi and oﬀer p1i→j , if ai’s turn and t=1
reject pt−1j→i and quit , if aj ’s turn and Ui(p
t−1
j→i)<Ui(sˆi)
apply Yi to Îi and prepare pti→j if aj ’s turn and Ui(p
t−1
j→i)≥Ui(sˆi)
if U∗i ≥0 accept pt−1j→i else reject,
oﬀer compromise pti→j , if ai’s turn and t>1
where Îi ⊂ I is the set of issues that are of lower priority to ai. The deﬁnition
of a speciﬁc strategy involves basically the speciﬁcation of a particular opening
negotiation tactic (e.g., the tactic “starting optimistic”) and a key concession
tactic to apply to the issues of low priority (e.g., the tactic “moderate”). These
and other negotiation tactics are deﬁned in the next subsection.
2.3 Negotiation Tactics
Negotiation tactics are functions that model the short-term moves designed to
enact high-level strategies. The following two groups of tactics will receive the
preponderance of our attention in this paper:
1. opening negotiation tactics − functions that specify the demands to be made
at the outset of negotiation;
2. concession tactics − functions that model the concessions to be made
throughout negotiation.
As mentioned above, tactics are functions of a single issue.
Concession Behaviour in Automated Negotiation 191
Opening Negotiation Tactics. Skilled negotiators often start with high de-
mands to leave room for later movement and hence elicit counterconcessions from
their opponent [12]. High initial demands also protect limits from detection and
underestimation (this is a concern about image loss). If limits are detected by
the opponent, he may become unwilling to accept a better oﬀer than the least-
acceptable one, dooming all higher aspirations. If limits are underestimated, the
opponent may become committed to unacceptable demands, fostering break-
down of negotiation. Thus, to avoid these dual dangers, bargainers typically
place their demands well above their limits as a sort of smoke screen. Further-
more, high initial demands are also partly designed to protect target points (this
is a concern about position loss). Clearly, bargainers often need to move in con-
cert with their opponent toward mutually acceptable agreements. This means
starting higher than targets and only moving down to them in coordination with
the opponent [14].
Noticeably, starting high frequently communicates an attitude of toughness
that can be reciprocated by the opponent, thus making negotiation “diﬃcult to
resolve” [6]. Hence, should bargainers start with a ﬁrm, determined stance, or
adopt a position of moderateness and understanding? It follows that bargainers
often decide how much to demand on the basis of the concessions they expect
from their opponent − the farther the opponent is expected to concede, the more
will be demanded (this phenomenon is referred to as tracking).
In general, three levels of initial demand are commonly discussed in the ne-
gotiation literature [6,15]: extreme or high, reasonable or moderate, and modest
or low. They have motivated the deﬁnition of the following opening negotiation
tactics:
1. starting optimistic − speciﬁes a value for an issue close to the optimistic
point;
2. starting realistic − speciﬁes a value for an issue in the range deﬁned by the
target and the optimistic points;
3. starting pessimistic − speciﬁes a value for an issue in the range deﬁned by
the target and the resistance points.
A formal deﬁnition of the tactic “starting optimistic” follows.
Deﬁnition 9 (Starting Optimistic). Let A={a1, a2} be the set of negotiating
agents and I={x1, . . . , xn} the negotiating agenda. Let D={D1, . . . , Dn} be the
set of issue domains. The tactic starting optimistic of an agent ai ∈A for an
issue xk ∈ I takes the form:
Oi(xk) = opt ik + 
where:
(i)  > 0 is small;
(ii) opt ik is the optimistic point of ai for xk. ”
The deﬁnition of the other two tactics is essentially identical to that of
“starting optimistic”, and is therefore omitted.
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Concession Tactics. Concessions are a powerful aspect of negotiation − with-
out them, in fact, some researchers consider that negotiation would not exist [19].
A concession is usually deﬁned as a change of oﬀer in the supposed direction of
the other party’s interests that reduces the level of beneﬁt sought. Concession
rate is the speed at which demand level declines over time. A bargainer’s de-
mand level can be thought of as the level of beneﬁt to the self associated with
the current demand or oﬀer [12,15].
Practically speaking, bargainers often enter negotiation expecting concessions.
Their opening position may be good for both sides and might have been the
ﬁnal settlement if the parties started negotiation from diﬀerent points. Even
so, bargainers generally resent a take-it-or-leave-it approach − an oﬀer that
may have been accepted had it emerged as a result of concession making may
be rejected when it is thrown on the table and presented as a fait accomply [6].
Ample research evidence indicates that the parties feel better about a settlement
when negotiation has involved a progression of concessions [14].
A formal deﬁnition of a generic concession tactic follows (in the interests
of readability, and without loss of generality, we consider that ai ∈A wants to
maximize xk ∈ I).
Deﬁnition 10 (Concession Tactic). Let A={a1, a2} be the set of negotiating
agents, I={x1, . . . , xn} the negotiating agenda, and D={D1, . . . , Dn} the set of
issue domains. A concession tactic Yi : Dk×[0, 1] → Dk of an agent ai ∈A for
an issue xk ∈ I is a function with the following general form:
Yi(xk, f ik ) = xk − f ik (xk−limik )
where:
(i) f ik is the concession factor of ai for xk;
(ii) limik is the limit of ai for xk. ”
Negotiators may consider strikingly diﬀerent patterns of concessions as nego-
tiation unfolds. However, the following three levels of concession magnitude are
commonly discussed in the negotiation literature [6,14]: large, substantial, and
small. To this we would add two other levels: null and complete. Accordingly,
we consider the following ﬁve concession tactics:
1. stalemate − models a null concession on an issue xk at stake;
2. tough − models a small concession on xk;
3. moderate − models a substantial concession on xk;
4. soft − models a large concession on xk;
5. accommodate − models a complete concession on xk.
These and other similar tactics are deﬁned by considering speciﬁc values for
the concession factor f ik . In particular, the “stalemate” tactic is deﬁned by
f ik = 0 and the “accommodate” tactic by f
i
k = 1. The other three tactics are
deﬁned by considering values for f ik in diﬀerent ranges (e.g., the “tough” tactic
by f ik ∈ ]0.00, 0.05], the “moderate” tactic by f ik ∈ ]0.05, 0.15], and the “soft”
tactic by f ik ∈ ]0.15, 0.20]).
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3 Related Work
Artiﬁcial intelligence (AI) researchers have investigated the design of agents
with negotiation competence from two main perspectives: a theoretical or for-
mal mathematical perspective and a practical or system-building perspective.
Researchers following the theoretical perspective have attempted mainly to de-
velop formal models of negotiation, i.e., models for describing, specifying, and
reasoning about the key features of negotiating agents. To this end, they have
drawn heavily on game-theoretic and economic methods (see, e.g., [2,5,18]). On
the other hand, researchers following the practical perspective have attempted
mainly to develop computational models of negotiation, i.e., models for speci-
fying the key data structures of negotiating agents and the processes operating
on these structures. They have drawn heavily on social sciences techniques for
understanding interaction and negotiation (see, e.g., [3,10,16]).
Overall, various researchers have developed models that incorporate speciﬁc
protocols (notably, the alternating oﬀers protocol) and libraries of negotiation
strategies (notably, concession strategies). However, the authors are aware of
no similar eﬀorts to deﬁne strategies as functions that specify the tactics to
be used both at the outset and throughout negotiation. Tactics, in turn, are
deﬁned as functions that specify the short-term moves to be made at each point
of negotiation. Our interest lies mainly in formalizing important strategies and
tactics motivated by rules-of-thumb distilled from good behavioral practice in
real-life negotiations.
4 Conclusion
This paper has presented a model for software agents that handles two-party and
multi-issue negotiation. The model incorporates a bilateral negotiation protocol,
a set of concession strategies, and a set of negotiation tactics. The protocol is an
alternating oﬀers protocol. The strategies are computationally tractable func-
tions that deﬁne the tactics to be used both at the beginning and during the
course of negotiation. The words “computationally tractable functions” presume
that agents are able to compute the strategies in a reasonable amount of time.
Furthermore, at every period of negotiation, the strategies state whether bar-
gaining should continue or terminate. The tactics are functions that specify the
individual moves to be made at each point of the negotiation process.
Autonomous agents equipped with the negotiation model are currently be-
ing developed. Our aim for the future is to perform a number of experiments
to empirically evaluate the key components of the agents. Also, notice that the
task of designing and implementing agents with negotiation competence involves
the consideration of insights from multiple relevant research areas. Accordingly,
we also intend to develop an interdisciplinary framework for automated negoti-
ation − game-theoretic (strategic) and behavioural negotiation theories should
mutually reinforce each other and contribute to richer negotiators.
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